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ESSAYS 
THE PATH NOT TAKEN: 
H. L. A. HART’S HARVARD ESSAY ON DISCRETION 
Nicola Lacey∗ 
It is an extraordinary privilege to be able to introduce a previously 
unpublished essay by H. L. A. Hart, one of the most distinguished fig-
ures in twentieth-century legal philosophy, alongside a fine commen-
tary by Geoffrey Shaw, the scholar whose intellectual imagination and 
meticulous archival research has brought the essay to light.  It is par-
ticularly apt that H. L. A. Hart’s essay should be published by this 
Review, appearing fifty-seven years after it was written in the early 
months of his visit to Harvard, thus joining a distinguished tradition 
of posthumously published scholarship of the 1950s, most notably Lon 
Fuller’s The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,1 and Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks’s The Legal Process.2  Its publication is also timely, albeit 
long delayed, in that it comes hard on the heels of a period in which 
the intellectual history of legal thought has been the subject of wide 
interest and some very powerful scholarship.3 
Hart’s year at Harvard significantly shaped the course of his sub-
sequent work.4  The essay now being published, entitled Discretion,5 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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helps to explain why that was the case, for it is a testimony to the in-
tensity of his engagement with colleagues in the Law School.  During 
the course of the year, he laid the foundations for the vast majority of 
his work over the next decade: for Causation in the Law,6 for The 
Concept of Law,7 and for Punishment and Responsibility.8  The stimu-
lating American context, as he later put it, “relaxed one’s neuroses”; 
“[i]deas started pullulating at a rather alarming rate.  I thought, ‘Am I 
going mad?’: I was getting so many different things inside.”9  
In his Essay, Shaw presents a searching analysis of the paper’s ar-
gument as well as a persuasive assessment of its overall significance, 
and I do not propose to tread the same ground.  In this brief introduc-
tion, I shall rather reflect, from a biographer’s viewpoint, on the signif-
icance of Discretion for our understanding of the trajectory of Hart’s 
ideas and on the significance of his year at Harvard.  I shall then move 
on to consider the intriguing question of why Hart did not subsequent-
ly publish or build on some of the key insights in the paper itself.  
Here I highlight the fact that, almost uniquely in Hart’s work, Discre-
tion features a notable emphasis on the significance of institutional 
factors in our understanding of the nature of legal decisionmaking; and 
I argue that Hart’s failure fully to develop this insight in the essay, or 
to build on it in his subsequent work, derives from the fact that such a 
development would have necessitated a diversion from the philosophi-
cal issues that were his core intellectual concern, and moreover would 
have presented certain dangers to his conception of legal positivism.  I 
shall conclude by considering what contribution the essay makes to 
our overall interpretation and evaluation of Hart’s legal philosophy. 
I.  H. L. A. HART AND HARVARD’S “YEAR OF JURISPRUDENCE” 
I should set out by confessing that when Geoffrey Shaw told me 
two years ago that he intended to work on a project exploring the in-
fluence of American ideas, and of the Process School in particular, on 
H. L. A. Hart, my interest in the idea was tinged with a generous dose 
of skepticism.  Notwithstanding the clear evidence, presented by Shaw 
in his Essay, of Hart’s early engagement with American ideas, notably 
his exchange with Edgar Bodenheimer in the pages of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review,10 my initial reaction was not far short of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 H. L. A. HART & A. M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). 
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Brock and Brian H. Harrison for their work on the history of Oxford University) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 10 See H. L. A. Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Profes-
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that of one of the most influential contemporary legal philosophers 
who, when I mentioned the project to him, described the Hart/ 
Bodenheimer exchange as a “dialogue of the deaf.”  Certainly, as I ar-
gued at length in my biography of Hart, his visit to Harvard chal-
lenged his Oxonian prejudice that law schools were poor intellectual 
cousins to philosophy departments, and broadened his conception of 
what legal scholarship could be: “It’s so odd after philosophy being the 
Queen of the faculties at Oxford to find it the Cinderella here and law 
right up.  Certainly the lawyers are far cleverer.”11  His diaries confirm 
the respect in which he held Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, as well as 
Paul Freund, whose lectures he attended, and Herbert Wechsler, his 
fellow visitor in 1956–1957, with whom he had many discussions of 
criminal law.12  Moreover, no one can doubt that his intellectual ex-
changes with Fuller were influential in shaping his interpretation of 
natural law theory in both the Holmes Lecture13 and The Concept of 
Law.  But it is equally clear that he was unsympathetic to what he 
took to be the naturalism of Fuller’s position.  Moreover, the sociologi-
cal jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, as much as legal realism, was in-
tellectually uncongenial from Hart’s point of view. 
So while my biographical interpretation gave significant weight to 
the importance of the Harvard year — in which he was working on 
virtually all of the ideas for which he remains famous — in stimulating 
Hart’s imagination and in particular launching him into a period of in-
tense writing for publication, my overall conclusion was that it was the 
intellectual resources of Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and Bentham, alongside 
the contemporary linguistic philosophy of J. L. Austin and Gilbert 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
That article shows that the main lines of argument of The Concept of Law were already well de-
veloped, and uses many phrases and examples that recur in the book.  See Geoffrey C. Shaw, Es-
say, H. L. A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV. L. REV. 666 
(2013).  Here, Hart elaborated the defense of analytical jurisprudence outlined in his inaugural 
lecture Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 37 (1954), and in his essay Philoso-
phy of Law and Jurisprudence in Britain (1945–1952), 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 355 (1953) [hereinafter 
Hart, Philosophy of Law].  Responding to Bodenheimer’s critique (and, in Hart’s view, misread-
ing) of Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, Hart defended himself against the view, common 
among American jurists, that positivism was to be equated with formalism — the idea that judges 
deduce their conclusions from closed legal premises.  He did so by emphasizing the “open texture” 
of legal language: even from a positivist point of view, legal reasoning could never be merely de-
ductive.  See Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra, at 956–57.  In responding to the criticism that 
positivism neglected the importance of disciplines other than philosophy, he emphasized the dis-
tinction between theories of law and law itself: while legal practice could undoubtedly be im-
proved by a systematic appreciation of the insights of other disciplines, legal theory, he insisted, 
was an autonomous intellectual approach in which philosophy was the appropriate disciplinary 
resource.  Id. at 954–57; see also Hart, Philosophy of Law, supra.   
 11 LACEY, supra note 4, at 187 (quoting a letter to his wife) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 12 See generally id. at 179–208 (discussing Hart’s time at Harvard). 
 13 The lecture was published as H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).  
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Ryle, that were the deep and abiding influences on Hart’s work.  No 
reasonable reader of Hart’s work could, I think, doubt that these were 
indeed his primary resources.  But the Discretion essay makes me 
think nonetheless that I underestimated both the degree to which his 
critical dialogue with American scholars such as Bodenheimer shaped 
his thinking at this time and the intensity of his engagement with Pro-
cess School ideas while at Harvard.  Shaw makes a powerful case, 
based in part on the volume of American readings in the courses in le-
gal philosophy that Hart designed at Oxford — reinforced, I would 
add, by his striking promotion of Ronald Dworkin as his successor in 
the Oxford Chair14 — for the existence of an abiding interest in and 
respect for the best American scholarship. 
As I shall argue below, however, the facts that he never published 
the Discretion essay, and that some of its key ideas are neither fully 
worked through in the essay itself nor pursued in his subsequent work, 
confirm that the institutional aspects of the analysis of law attempted 
by the Process School did not engage Hart’s deepest interest, which 
always centered on philosophy.15  Hence, although the framework of 
Discretion sketches an agenda for engagement between Hart’s  
approach and questions of institutional structure and roles, the  
questions that are most fully pursued in the essay are those where 
Hart’s analytic techniques can be applied more straightforwardly to 
questions about the nature and scope of discretion.  These questions 
equally engaged the Process School and touched on Hart and the  
Process scholars’ shared concern to find a middle path between the 
mistakes of formalism and those of legal realism.  In addition, as we 
shall see, the question of whether the standards constraining the exer-
cise of judicial discretion were to be regarded as part of the law 
touched on another key dilemma for Hart, keen as he was to retain a 
version of legal positivism in which all genuinely legal standards found 
their origin in and derived their validity from a complex social fact: 
the rule of recognition.16 
As background to our assessment of the significance of Discretion, 
it is worth knowing that its presentation to the Legal Philosophy Dis-
cussion Group had a somewhat mixed reception from Hart’s Harvard 
colleagues, many of whom were skeptical about the value of his meth-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 LACEY, supra note 4, at 290–93. 
 15 There is much biographical evidence of the depth of this intellectual attachment.  As he 
wrote to his wife in 1944: “[P]hilosophy is my only permanent intellectual interest and my mind 
like a hen returning to roost willy-nilly does return to the subject whenever I am not doing any-
thing else.”  Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16 Hart explained the rule of recognition as the rule that “will specify some feature or features 
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a 
rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.”  HART, supra note 7, at 92. 
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od of focusing on precise linguistic usage by setting out and analyzing 
a number of different senses in which the term “discretion” was used.  
As Shaw notes, Hart did however regard the presentation as having 
been a success, and observed wryly that he suspected that the (general-
ly silent) untenured professors “had enjoyed watching him challenge 
the ‘potentates’”!17  This description of his counterparts is testimony 
not only to his assessment of the hierarchy of the Law School but also 
his insecurity, in his early months at Harvard, about how his genre of 
work was being received: even if the locals conceded that a positivist 
could be “quite a nice man,”18 Hart’s approach was very different from 
that of the prevailing intellectual culture at the Law School.  In par-
ticular, Hart’s predilection for linguistic philosophy, though one of the 
reasons for Fuller’s sponsorship of his visit,19 was far from congenial 
to his Harvard colleagues.  Most of them would probably have sympa-
thized with Fuller’s view as expressed to Hart a decade later, in a 
good-humored exchange that nonetheless reveals a genuine difference 
in their assessment of the values of the analytic method:  
In the current issue of the Journal of Legal Education there is a review by 
a man who has studied under both of us.  At this distance in time it is a 
little hard for me to estimate how much damage my course did to him, but 
the review seems to me to reveal the truly devastating effects on a medio-
cre mind of too much exposure to ordinary-language philosophy.20   
Hart’s diaries suggest that while he formed a relationship with 
Henry Hart, a leading Legal Process scholar, it was not an entirely 
easy one: Herbert Hart remembered his namesake as “exuding nervous 
energy, pacing up and down for two hours before every lecture, chain-
smoking, and castigating Herbert for his mistaken positivist views.”21  
This sense of being, though a privileged visitor, something of an out-
sider to the Law School’s intellectual community would, given Hart’s 
general disposition, have led him to take especial care in preparing his 
presentation to a discussion group that was intended to be the institu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 LACEY, supra note 4, at 188; see also Shaw, supra note 10, at 667. 
 18 LACEY, supra note 4, at 181 (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Shaw, supra note 10, 
at 688.  Hart’s amusing example, in the Discretion essay, of a person giving reasons for choosing 
between a martini and a sherry, see Hart, supra note 5, at 657, in fact offers a  
fascinating glimpse of his personality: feelings that he had either talked too much or not enough at 
social events haunted him through the early part of his professional life, see LACEY, supra note 4, 
at 128. 
 19 See Memorandum from Lon L. Fuller (undated) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, Folder 14); see also LACEY, supra note 4, at 184. 
 20 Letter from Lon L. Fuller to H. L. A. Hart (Oct. 18, 1965) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library, Papers of Lon L. Fuller, Box 3, Folder 14).  See generally Nicola Lacey, Out of the 
“Witches’ Cauldron”?: Reinterpreting the Context and Reassessing the Significance of the Hart-
Fuller Debate, in THE HART-FULLER DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (Peter 
Cane ed., 2010).   
 21 LACEY, supra note 4, at 187. 
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tional centerpiece of “the year of jurisprudence” in which he and Julius 
Stone were visiting Harvard.22  This in itself may help to explain the 
effort that Hart, unusually, put into connecting linguistic analysis with 
the Process School’s interest in the capacity of institutional arrange-
ments to shape the course of legal argumentation. 
II.  DISCRETION IN THE CONTEXT OF HART’S WORK 
As Shaw points out, I (like other scholars) was aware that Hart had 
presented a paper on discretion to the Legal Philosophy Discussion 
Group in the early part of his visit to Harvard.  Given that the ques-
tion of judicial discretion was to become the linchpin of his decades-
long debate with Ronald Dworkin, it was obvious that his paper 
would be of the greatest interest.  But the draft was not among Hart’s 
papers.  Given his general level of disorganization — on one occasion a 
lodger at the Harts’ home, returning to find the living room in total 
chaos, mistakenly thought that the house had been burgled — I as-
sumed that the paper had been lost.23  Precisely because I was not fo-
cusing on the possibility that Process School ideas might have been in-
fluential on Hart’s thinking, I did not research Henry Hart’s, Sacks’s 
or Freund’s papers in the Law School archive, though I relied heavily 
on the rich resources of H. L. A. Hart’s and Fuller’s papers.  So there, 
for a further decade, lay the small but sparkling gem of intellectual 
history that appears in this volume of the Review. 
When Shaw told me that he had found the essay, I was of course 
intrigued.  As a biographer, one’s excitement about such discoveries is, 
it must be admitted, always shaded with a certain anxiety.  Biograph-
ical method is very far from scientific, and any biographical interpreta-
tion has to be regarded as provisional — or, as Hart might have put it, 
defeasible — on the discovery of countervailing material.  The discov-
ery of a lost essay also presented a potential ethical dilemma: particu-
larly given what we know of the exceptionally high intellectual stand-
ards to which Hart held himself, and the painstaking work that he 
devoted to polishing drafts of the papers and books that he published, 
the question of whether the essay was suitable for publication immedi-
ately presented itself.  Moreover this question was particularly salient 
given the debate about the posthumous publication of the Postscript to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 See id. at 184. 
 23 I was not until recently aware of Professor Anthony Sebok’s discovery of the essay, which is 
referred to and quoted from in ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JU-
RISPRUDENCE 169 n.232 (1998); and in Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of 
the Rule of Recognition, 52 SMU L. REV. 75, 99–100 (1999).  See also Shaw, supra note 10, at 670 
& n.22. 
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The Concept of Law,24 meticulously constructed by Penelope Bulloch 
and Professors Joseph Raz and Timothy Endicott from the various (in-
complete) versions that existed at Hart’s death, which some scholars 
feel did not enhance Hart’s reputation.25 
I therefore read the draft with a mixture of excitement and trepida-
tion.  The latter very rapidly gave way to the former.  First, notwith-
standing Hart’s opening piece of academic politesse, on circulating the 
paper, in describing it as a “fugitive” piece not worthy of taking “so 
durable a form,”26 Discretion turns out to be both fairly polished and 
of the deepest interest in shedding light on his thinking in the years 
during which he was working on The Concept of Law.  It is moreover 
rich in the qualities that made Hart deservedly famous: it exhibits his 
trademark ability to reveal, through elegant and meticulous analysis of 
linguistic usage, important distinctions implicit in social practices, and 
to illuminate the deep logic of those practices.  Second, the essay, like 
the working notebook to The Concept of Law,27 discloses a close inter-
est in, and acknowledgment of the potential significance of, differently 
configured legal institutions and indeed areas of legal doctrine in shap-
ing and constraining discretion: an interest I had noted to have disap-
peared in the final version of the book, and to have been more or less 
absent in Hart’s subsequent work.28 
I have already mentioned that Hart’s levels of organization, as well 
as the length of his writing career, were such as to make it entirely 
plausible that he had lost track of the essay.  Shaw rightly notes that 
the appearance of some passages of the paper in The Concept of Law 
suggests that Hart retained a copy of the essay while working on the 
final draft of the book.  I have some reason to believe that a number of 
Hart’s papers went missing after his office at University College was 
cleared following his death in 1992.29  We will never know whether he 
had a copy of the draft at hand as he crafted his main engagements 
with Ronald Dworkin’s work on discretion or as he struggled with 
endless versions of what became the Postscript.  But given what we 
know about his exceptionally sharp mind and outstandingly strong 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 238 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d 
ed. 1994) (1961) (publishing the Postscript alongside the reissued original). 
 25 See LACEY, supra note 4, at 353. 
 26 Hart, supra note 5, at 652. 
 27 The notebook is held in the library archive at New College, Oxford; Hart Papers (ACC 
2006/6), Box 1, Folder 9.1. 
 28 See LACEY, supra note 4, at 226–33, 348–53; Nicola Lacey, Lecture, Analytical Jurispru-
dence Versus Descriptive Sociology Revisited, 84 TEX. L. REV. 945, 956–58 (2006). 
 29 Professor John Finnis, in an interview for the Hart biography, told me that he had seen a 
folder relating to Hart’s correspondence with Abraham Harari, a critic of Hart, which I was par-
ticularly keen to find, in Hart’s University College office.  See LACEY, supra note 4, at 274–77.  
The file unfortunately never materialized among the papers at Hart’s home. 
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memory, we can be confident that he would have been able to recall 
the main ideas of his paper.  The fact that Hart clearly did draw on 
the philosophical parts of the paper in later work, yet failed to draw 
on, let alone develop, the intriguing fragments of insight about the sig-
nificance of institutional structure, cannot, therefore, be put down to 
accident: it tells us something important about Hart’s intellectual 
choices. 
III.  DISCRETION AND HART’S THEORETICAL DILEMMAS 
Ever since the publication of Ronald Dworkin’s famous essay The 
Model of Rules30 in 1967, the question of discretion has occupied a 
prominent place in analytical jurisprudence.  The positivist account of 
adjudication, Dworkin argued, entailed a strong form of judicial dis-
cretion that implied a quasi-legislative role for judges inconsistent with 
their constitutional position.  Hart’s long struggle to answer Dworkin 
makes it apparent that the question of discretion touched on a number 
of core puzzles related to Hart’s positivist theory of law.  This theory 
was carefully crafted to occupy a middle point between what Hart saw 
as the “nightmare” excesses of American Realism, which saw legal 
rules not as normative standards but rather as predictions of official 
behavior, and those of the “noble dream” theories, which unrealistically 
regarded legal standards as determining clear results in all cases.31  
These latter theories included not only formalism, with its purely de-
ductive view of legal reasoning, but also natural law theory, which 
mistook legal for moral validity, in the process committing the logical 
error of deriving an “is” from an “ought.”  The theory of adjudication 
later developed by Dworkin also counted, of course, as a classic in-
stance of the American “Noble Dream” from Hart’s point of view.  In 
this context, it is fascinating that the 1956 essay, Discretion, antici-
pates in key ways Dworkin’s interpretation of the core issue, focusing 
itself, as Shaw argues, on debunking the objection that the existence of 
discretion in judicial decisionmaking is inconsistent with the rule of 
law in that it leaves unelected decisionmakers with a free choice, un-
constrained by legal standards that have a proper democratic mandate. 
Hart’s approach is straightforward and illuminating.  Discretion, 
he argued, is best understood as existing where “there remains a choice 
to be made by the person to whom the discretion is authorized which 
is not determined by principles which may be formulated beforehand, 
although the factors which we must take into account and conscien-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967). 
 31 See H. L. A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). 
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tiously weigh may themselves be identifiable”;32 it is “the sphere where 
arguments in favour of one decision or another may be rational with-
out being conclusive.”33  He used the techniques of linguistic analysis 
to map the field of discretion by drawing a set of key distinctions: that 
between express and tacit discretion; that between different sources of 
discretion (relative ignorance of fact and relative indeterminacy of 
aim); that between different institutions (courts and administrative 
bodies); and that between different institutional roles and functions 
within which discretion may be granted explicitly or arise tacitly (li-
censing, allocations of resources, common law and statutory interpreta-
tion, sentencing, and so on).  “[B]ecause we are men not gods,”34 we 
must accept that it is part of the human condition that in many 
decisionmaking contexts, even where governed by rules, there is no 
“one correct answer.”35  But this uncertainty, Hart was keen to empha-
size, does not mean that discretionary decisions are unconstrained:  
rather, the nature of the institutional role, the history of the 
decisionmaking, and our understanding of the purposes of the regula-
tory system or area of legal doctrine will usually generate plentiful 
standards to guide, though not to determine, the decisionmaker’s 
choice.  Indeed, repeated discretionary decisionmaking over time, 
within a particular institution, will lead to a process of accumulating 
guidelines,36 in something of the manner of the “institutional history” 
that Dworkin saw as an essential component in the decisionmaking 
balance along with the principles emerging from institutional and 
background morality.37  To put Hart’s argument in terms of Dworkin’s 
later argument, discretion is in Hart’s view thus rendered “weak”  
rather than “strong,” and is accordingly consistent with the rule of law. 
Why might Hart have seen this commonsensical argument as po-
tentially threatening to the equilibrium of his positivism?  There were 
two reasons.  First, Hart seemed unwilling in his later work to explain 
how the broader constraining criteria that rebut the rule of law objec-
tion to discretion could be accommodated within the identifying crite-
ria of his rule of recognition.  Indeed, the most natural reading of Dis-
cretion seems to be that he did not regard those constraints as 
counting as law in the same sense that rules do.38  Hence, on the face 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Hart, supra note 5, at 661. 
 33 Id. at 665. 
 34 Id. at 661 (emphasis omitted).  
 35 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 36 See id. at 660. 
 37 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (1975). 
 38 I am inferring this from Hart’s note that “the distinguishing feature of the discretion case is 
that there remains a choice to be made . . . which is not determined by principles which may be 
formulated beforehand,” Hart, supra note 5, at 661, and from Hart’s reference to discretionary 
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of it — and without further rebutting argument — the rule of law ob-
jection stood.  An argument could clearly be constructed that judges 
were implicitly or explicitly given authority to decide in the light of 
those broader standards, hence sustaining the rule of recognition as the 
sole touchstone for the validity of legal standards.  But to reconcile this 
argument with Hart’s overall conception of law would require the sort 
of further argument later developed by Neil MacCormick to the effect 
that Hart’s rule of recognition could in fact accommodate the binding 
legal principles whose importance Dworkin emphasized.39  And even 
this argument was vulnerable to Dworkin’s objection that a more in-
clusive sources-based touchstone of legal validity would be incapable 
of accommodating the weighing of reasons intrinsic to the evaluative 
character of legal reasoning.40  This argument, of course, became a 
central feature of Dworkin’s own theory, and it is fascinating to see ar-
guments about the weighing of reasons play a prominent role in Hart’s 
account of discretionary decisionmaking in this essay.41  But how was 
this line of reasoning to sit with his developing idea that law is a sys-
tem of rules identified by reference to the rule of recognition and exist-
ing in terms of simple validity, rather than having an evaluative 
weight that is contingent on the balance of reasons in any particular 
case?42 
Second, and following on from this point, discretion poses the diffi-
culty of retaining the distinction between core cases, where rules readi-
ly settle decision, and penumbral cases, where discretion is in play.  
For if the broader evaluations of purpose, policy, or principle that 
guide discretionary decisionmaking can in fact be invoked, as Dworkin 
suggested, to question the weight or interpretation of rules, then the 
idea of law as a system of rules is destabilized by the entry of extra-
legal criteria of an evaluative kind, notably in this context, arguments 
about aim or purpose.  This argument potentially edged Hart’s positiv-
ism in the direction of natural law theory, and moreover made vulner-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
decisionmaking as inevitably implying a “leap” beyond established rules, id. at 665 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 39 See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978). 
 40 See Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 878 (1972). 
 41 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 5, at 659–60.  The key difference between Hart’s position at this 
stage and Dworkin’s later position is Hart’s clear and repeated denial of the existence of a single 
right answer identifiable through a process of legal reasoning, as opposed to better or worse an-
swers to discretionary decision.  Compare id., with Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, 
MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H. L. A. HART 58, 59 (P. M. S. Hacker & J. 
Raz eds., 1977) (“[T]he occasions in which a legal question has no right answer in our own legal 
system must be much rarer than is generally supposed.”). 
 42 Clearly, Discretion predates The Concept of Law, but it seems likely from Hart’s working 
notebooks and from his other published work that the main ideas of the book had been formulat-
ed by the time of his visit to Harvard. 
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able his key distinction between a core of settled meaning and a pen-
umbra of discretion. 
In seeking to distance these arguments, Hart turned to the tools of 
analytic philosophy, and Shaw provides an excellent analysis of the 
various twists of his argument and their upshot for his overall position.  
But it is worth noting that, of the five questions that Hart sets out as 
his core preoccupation at the outset of his essay, questions one and 
three — what is discretion, and why must we accept it? — receive the 
lion’s share of his attention,43 and for good reason.  For these are the 
two questions that lie squarely within the terrain of analytical juris-
prudence, while question four — what values does discretion menace 
or promote? — lies most naturally in the terrain of normative political 
or moral philosophy, and questions two and five — under what condi-
tions do we tolerate discretion in legal systems, and what can be done 
to maximize its benefits and minimize its harms? — most naturally 
lend themselves to a social science analysis.  This distinction in my 
view explains why these questions are treated only briefly through ref-
erence to the need for expertise and professional experience, adequate 
procedures, the absence of prejudice or private interest, and so on,44 
and have dropped entirely out of view once we get to chapter seven of 
The Concept of Law, resurfacing only in the sketch of natural justice 
that appears later in the book.  To put this in terms of the key features 
of Process School thinking, Hart’s engagement with and philosophical 
development of the notion of reasoned elaboration in this essay flowed 
directly into his later work, while his fragmentary engagement with 
the idea that institutional competence is of significance for the course 
of legal reasoning and our understanding of law dropped out of view. 
In the analytic structure that is set out on page four of the pub-
lished essay, significant emphasis is given not merely to different  
discretion-holding bodies but also to the varying roles that those bod-
ies, or officials within them, play.  But as the paper develops, its argu-
ment becomes more abstract, and little texture is given to the institu-
tional role occupied by different sorts of decisionmakers, nor is much 
made of the different structures of the relevant decisionmaking institu-
tions.  Hypothetical examples such as that of the young hostess — a 
wonderful period piece — gradually come to dominate the argument, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 The structure of the paper is broadly as follows: pages one through three of the fourteen-
page essay, as published, deal with introductory and methodological issues; pages four through 
thirteen deal with questions one and three; question five, about the optimal arrangements for us-
ing discretion, is considered on pages thirteen and fourteen, which also touch on question four; 
and brief comments on question two, about the conditions under which we tolerate discretion, are 
interspersed with the discussion of question three on pages four through thirteen.  See Hart, supra 
note 5. 
 44 See id. at 661, 664.  
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and the opportunity to consider whether there may be systematic dif-
ferences bearing on questions two and five between, for instance, col-
legiate and unitary decisionmaking bodies, elected and appointed 
decisionmakers, or expert/professional and lay decisionmakers, is not 
taken up.  So virtually nothing is made of the potential that Hart’s an-
alytic framework would have offered in terms of a closer exploration of 
the ways in which institutional factors — the structure of different 
agencies; the roles accorded to their officials; the different positions of 
decisionmakers such as judges, jurors, and administrative officials of 
various kinds; the accountability mechanisms to which they are sub-
ject; and the tasks that they are assigned — may generate constraints.  
Though he suggested that the distinction may be of significance,45 
there is no attempt to explore in greater depth the potential differ-
ences, in terms of either generating constraints or the normative chal-
lenge posed by discretionary choice, between avowed and tacit discre-
tion.46  Neither the question of the relationship between institutional 
design and the suitability of certain institutional forms for certain 
types of decisions — with a consequent upshot for the relationship  
between institutional structure and the quality of decisionmaking — 
nor the related question of how particular institutional structures can 
produce implicit constraints on and guidelines for decisionmaking, is 
pursued. 
These considerations about the interplay between institutional de-
sign and the effectiveness and accountability of decisionmaking were, 
of course, a key aspect of Process School scholarship.  They have also 
figured prominently in the very considerable socio-legal literature on 
discretion that has accumulated over the decades since Hart’s essay 
was written.47  Professor John Bell’s illuminating account describes the 
jurisprudential issues raised by this extensive literature.  As Bell has 
put it, empirical studies of discretionary decisionmaking, much of it 
within public administrative bodies ranging from sentencing courts to 
regulatory bodies such as environmental protection agencies, suggest 
that “the flexibilities which discretion permits, rather than legal rules 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 Id. at 656, 665. 
 46 See id. at 663. 
 47 See generally MICHAEL ADLER & STEWART ASQUITH, DISCRETION AND WELFARE 
(1981); STEWART ASQUITH, CHILDREN AND JUSTICE (1983); ROBERT BALDWIN, REGULAT-
ING THE AIRLINES (1985); JOHN L. COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESS-
ES (1981); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); GENEVRA 
RICHARDSON ET AL., POLICING POLLUTION (1983); THE USES OF DISCRETION (Keith 
Hawkins ed., 1992).  For contributions pondering the jurisprudential implications of this work, 
see generally D. J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS (1986); John Bell, Discretionary  
Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential View, in The USES OF DISCRETION, supra, at 89; Nicola 
Lacey, The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm, in THE USES OF DIS-
CRETION, supra, at 361; and John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: 
Rules Versus Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307 (1995).  
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are central to the operation of law.”48  This insight, Bell argues, implies 
that from the point of view of legal theory, “law has to be understood 
not in terms of a discrete set of normative standards, but primarily 
within an institutional context.”49  Indeed, empirical studies suggest 
that “reasons drawn from legal sources and other reasons are closely 
intertwined.”50  The role of law in the vast areas in which discretion 
prevails is “not so much providing legal reasons why an act should be 
done, but providing legal reasons why others should view such an act 
as authoritative and effective”51 — a role that might best be elaborated 
by a nuanced analysis of the various aspects of official decisionmakers’ 
roles and the ways in which these aspects are reflected in institutional 
design.  The fact that this socio-legal research suggests that discretion-
ary decisionmaking constitutes, as it were, the core rather than the  
penumbra of legal decisionmaking reality makes Hart’s decision not to 
build on the fragmentary insights of the early Discretion essay all the 
more regrettable. 
An analogous conclusion is reached by Professor Gerald Postema in 
his retrospective on the Hart-Fuller debate.  Postema suggests that in 
many ways Hart’s arguments about the core and penumbra should 
have drawn him toward the common law interpretation of law as an 
emerging set of conventions within a particular professional and insti-
tutional tradition.  As Postema puts it: 
[A] very widely shared understanding of the rule of law favours a  
common-law conception of law and legal reasoning over Hart’s settled-
meaning positivism and its more sophisticated elaborations.  We look to 
law to subject the exercise of political power to public accountability and 
public accountability adequate to this task requires an institutionalised 
discipline of practical reason as conceived broadly along lines of common-
law jurisprudence rather than conformity to determinate public rules.52  
This idea of an ongoing practice of decisionmaking as generating a 
“body of materials [that] provides a rich context of relatively fixed 
points from which discursive argument on contested issues of law can 
proceed”53 is, of course, rooted in a fundamentally institutional view of 
law.  Hence, a more fully institutionalized understanding of law as a 
social practice — perhaps drawing, as I suggested in Hart’s biography, 
on a linguistic philosophy influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 Bell, supra note 47, at 92. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 104. 
 51 Id. at 105. 
 52 Gerald J Postema, Positivism and the Separation of Realists from Their Scepticism, in THE 
HART-FULLER DEBATE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 20, at 259, 275 (em-
phasis added); see also id. at 266–79. 
 53 Id. at 275; see also A. W. B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ES-
SAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 77, 94–98 (A. W. B. Simpson ed., 1973). 
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ception of language games as embedded in forms of life, rather than by 
J. L. Austin’s more austere ordinary language philosophy — might 
well have emerged had Hart pursued this line of analysis.54  But it 
would have done so at the cost of significantly complicating the posi-
tion of the rule of recognition in his positivist account. 
It is therefore doubly disappointing that Hart failed to pursue his 
fifth question about how discretion might be most effectively struc-
tured, both because such an engagement would have invited a produc-
tive dialogue between analytical jurisprudence and socio-legal studies, 
and because it might have generated a more robust response to the 
rule of law objection.  But equally, it is not surprising that he did not 
do so.  For to answer the question in a satisfactory way, he would have 
had to develop his theory in one of three directions, none of which was 
congenial to him.  First, and remaining within a philosophical meth-
odology, he could have moved in a more fully normative direction, 
abandoning or modifying the parsimonious conception of law as con-
sisting solely of standards validated in terms of the complex social 
practice that constitutes the rule of recognition, and instead attempting 
a more ambitious ontology of legal reasons capable of constraining dis-
cretion, in the manner later developed by Ronald Dworkin.55  Second, 
he could have moved in the common law direction favored by 
Postema, accepting a historicized view of law as an emerging set of 
practices rooted in a set of institutional structures and a profession 
with its complex array of roles and conventions.  Or third, he could 
have interested himself in the systematic lessons to be learned from 
empirical studies in law, at the very least immersing himself in enough 
of that empirical literature to generate insights into further distinctions 
that might be usefully developed in terms of the structure of the insti-
tutions within which discretion is exercised and the professional train-
ing and responsibilities of discretionary decisionmakers.  This third 
approach, I suggest, would have allowed him to make good on what 
he later clarified to be his real aspiration in describing The Concept of 
Law as “an essay in descriptive sociology” as much as in analytical ju-
risprudence56: to provide the “normative concepts required for a de-
scriptive sociology.”57  But the link between institutional form and the 
quality of decisionmaking that so interested the Process School theo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 LACEY, supra note 4, at 215–19. 
 55 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MAT-
TER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 56 HART, supra note 7, at vii.  
 57 Lacey, supra note 28, at 949 (quoting one of Hart’s notebooks).  Hart’s original claim was 
made in his 1961 work, The Concept of Law, see HART, supra note 7, at vii, and his revised claim 
was made in his interview with David Sugarman, see David Sugarman, Hart Interviewed: H. L. 
A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 267, 291 (2005).  
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rists, and that is so manifest in Fuller’s The Forms and Limits of Ad-
judication,58 simply did not engage Hart’s deep interest.  And both the 
second and third routes would have led him in the direction of a more 
contingent, historically specific conception of law and away from the 
primarily philosophical methods that he favored.  Apart from noting 
the very difficult analytic and normative task that Hart set for himself 
by insisting on a core of law with settled meaning and no space for 
discretion, we can also reflect, then, on how helpful a more elaborated 
version of Hart’s account of discretion might have been for the accu-
mulating empirical and socio-theoretic literature on discretion.  But 
such a development of his thought, it is clear, was ruled out by Hart’s 
insistence — emphasized, significantly, in his Reply to Professor 
Bodenheimer — on the autonomous nature and tasks of legal philoso-
phy, as opposed to legal reasoning.59 
IV.  THE PATH NOT TAKEN (BY HART . . .) 
In Discretion, we can glimpse the sort of articulation that might 
have been achieved between analytical jurisprudence and the analysis 
of discretion as a social phenomenon had Hart’s interests in law 
ranged beyond the philosophical.  As it is, the failure to develop fully 
the institutional line of thought even in this paper, its absence from 
The Concept of Law, and its failure to resurface in his engagements 
with Dworkin in the 1980s all tell us that this essay was a particular 
effort on Hart’s part, stimulated by the Harvard context and his intel-
lectual respect for his Process School colleagues, to expand his intellec-
tual horizons into terrain closer to the social sciences, and to explain 
the extent to which the analytic philosophical approach could clarify, 
refine, and advance the Process School’s intellectual project.  Even 
had he had the Discretion essay on hand when replying to Dworkin, I 
conclude, it is unlikely that he would have drawn on its fragmentary 
institutional insights; for the development of his analysis of constraints 
on discretion through an institutional analysis would not have deliv-
ered the purely philosophical rebuttal that he sought, while potentially 
compromising his idea that law’s normativity derives entirely from the 
rule of recognition. 
Hart’s essay stands, then, as intriguing evidence of a path that Hart 
himself chose not to follow.  That path has, however, been taken by a 
number of influential thinkers in the last twenty years; and it is one 
that represents, to my mind, a most productive way forward for legal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 See Fuller, supra note 1.  
 59 See Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 10, at 954–55.  
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theory today.60  Discretion not only looks back to the issues that pre-
occupied American lawyers in the 1950s, but also touches on many of 
the enduring themes of legal theory over the last sixty-five years.  
There is sadness, as one reads its pages, in thinking that Ronald 
Dworkin, whose work so directly emerged from the debate that this 
essay represents, will never read it.  But there is also cause for celebra-
tion, as we reflect on the extraordinary intellectual advances that came 
out of the half century of Anglo-American dialogue that Discretion 
and other essays of the 1950s inaugurated.  May that dialogue, stimu-
lated by Harvard’s “year of jurisprudence” in 1956–1957, long contin-
ue to flourish; and may the publication of this fascinating essay en-
courage more scholars to follow Shaw and other recent scholars’ 
example in mining the rich resources of law school archives at Har-
vard and beyond.61 
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 60 See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCI-
ETY (2001); WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM 
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); Roger Cotterrell, Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Socio-
logically?, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y 171 (1998); Lacey, supra note 28; Nicola Lacey, The Jurisprudence An-
nual Lecture 2013 — Institutionalising Responsibility: Implications for Jurisprudence, 4 JURIS-
PRUDENCE 1, 1–19 (2013).  
 61 See sources cited supra notes 3, 24. 
